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INTERNATIONAL LAW IN MUNICIPAL COURTS ANALYSING A FIFTY YEARS EXPERIENCE
Gautam Narasimhan

*

INTRODUCTION
Apart from the seminal work by S.K. Agarwala and P.c. Rao, wherein they
analysed the role of International law in Indian Courts, there is a great vacuum as
regards an analysis on the role of International law in interpretation. Furthermore,
there is a lack in the theoretical understanding of the topic. The relevance of the
topic at hand is felt to be of much significance given the need shown by the judiciary to innovate and be dynamic. This article asks the question, as to whether the
activist judiciary in the Country has made use of the principles of International
law in its effort to innovate? And if so, under what legal justification and how.
These questions if answered merely through the eyes of an Intemationallawyer
would appear to be myopic. This essay looks at the role of International law as
envisaged by "domestic courts" in India in its discourses on Constitutional and
legal issues.
However, before proceeding to the issues at hand, a study of theoretical inputs would become relevant to more easily understand the relationship ofInternationallaw and municipal law. According to the Dualists, including Triepel and
Anzolltti, International law and municipal law are not only different legal domains
but also different legal systems. On the other hand, the Monists, like Kelsen,
Verdross, Scelle and Kunz believe, both International law and the State Law function as one single entity of law serving the needs of the human community in one
way or the other. The monists stuck to the belief that the whole legal system is one
unified branch in which International law operates as a part and neither municipal
law nor International law is above the system nor is it separate from the system.
Oppenheim, I states that the difference between the two schools of thought are
primarily based on the difference in perception, firstly, on the sources of Internationallaw and domestic law; secondly, with regard to the relationship regulated
by International law and municipal law, and thirdly, with respect to the substance of
the two laws. Here a jurisprudential debate is not warrated but what is interesting
for the purposes of this debate is that this difference has given rise to two modes of

*

IV Year, B.A., LL.B. (Hons.), NLSIU, Bangalore.
H. Lauterpacht, 1 Oppenheim s International Law 37-39, 8th ed., (1955). See also Martin Dixon
and Robert Mcorquodale; Cases and Materials on International Law, 95 (1995).
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interpretation as regards International law in municipal law. That of the transformation theory of interpretation and that of the incorporation theory.2
The adherents of the Transformation Theory canvass the view that for a
State to enforce the norms of International law (which became settled law either
on account of customary rules or under a treaty) the same has to undergo transformation from its International character to municipal character. Hence, according
to the proponents of this theory, International law (whether it be based as treaties
or customary) has no utility in the interpreation of rights and duties in the domestic
front unless the same has been specifically recognised by legislation. On the other
hand, those who believe in the 'Incorporation' school of thought, state that Principles of International law (and even treaties) can be utili sed to interpret domestic
actions and that International law should be utilised as an effective tool of interpretation, without the necessity of transforming it by an act of the legislature.
It is imperative to understand the British position before undertaking the journey as regards the interpretation of domestic Acts. Generally stated, the British
position follows a distinction as regards treaties and customary practises. The
broadly stated position is:
1.

Customary principles of International law form part of the law of the land.

2.

Binding treaties which are part of International law do not form part of the
law of the land unless expressly made so by the legislature.

3.

On the question as to which would prevail in case of a direct conflict between
a treaty and a law enacted by the Parliament, it has been decided that if a
treaty had been enforced through law enacted by Parliament, then such a law
would prevail over the earlier inconsistent British law and not otherwise.3

Hence in light of these principles, the British Courts have refused to consider
treaties in the interpretation of any ambiguity resulting in any municipal action.
Such a position has found consistent restatement by the Courts, starting from the
case of the Parliament Belge4, Solomon v. Commissioners of Customs and Exer-

2

Fitzmaurice considers that the debate between monism and dualism is 'unreal, artificial and
strictly beside the point' for there can be no controversy as there is no common field in which
the two legal systems both simultaneously have their spheres of activity. G.Fitzmaurice, "The
General Principles of International Law considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law",
(1957-II) 92 RC 5, at pp. 70-71, 79-80.

3

Ostime v. Australian Mutual Provident Fund Society (1959) All. E.R. 345.

4

(1878-79) 4 PD 129.
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cis/ and in the famous International Tin Council case.6 However recently, the
House of Lords, in Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim,? vide Lord Templeman
covertly recognised a treaty (in this case the U.K. was not party to the particular
treaty which was establishing the Arab Monetary Fund), thus allowing the International Organisation which was established as a consequence of the Treaty to sue in
the English Courts against the Respondent.
As regards Customary International law, the dictum of Lord Mansfield in
Triquet v. Bath8, wherein he stated that the 'law of nations was part of the law of
the land' still holds stead. In Chung Chi Cheung v. The King,9 the Privy Council
stated that "The Courts acknowledge the existence of a body of rules which nations accept amongst themselves. On any judicial issue they seek to ascertain what
the relevant rule is, and having found it, they will treat it as incorporated into the
domestic law, so far as it is not inconsistent with rules enacted by statutes or finally declared by their tribunals. Lord Denning clarified the position further in the
Trendext case,1O that as regards customary International principles of law, the
doctrine of incoroporation did apply and that Courts could incorporate changes in
the principles of Customary International law without the sanction of Parliament.
As seen, there is an apparent difference of the utilisation of International
treaties and of customary principles of International law. The difference is based
on the reasoning that since it is Parliament which has the power to make treaties,
they should not be incorporated whereas since Parliament has no control over
customary principles of International law, these principles should be incorporated and considered for interpreting municipal acts. The correctness of the difference and also the justification for the difference between treaties and customary International law will be considered threadbare during the course of this article.
INDIAN COURTS AND TREATY PROVISIONS
As stated earlier, the Courts have stated in clear terms that it cannot apply the
provisions of a treaty directly into the municipal legal systems. They require that
unless the International obligations have been 'transformed' into laws, they cannot

5
6

(1967) 2 QB 116.
(1990) 2 AC 418

7
8

(1991) 1All. E R 871.
(1746) 3 Burr 1478.

9

(1939) AC 160.

10 (1977) Q.B. 529.
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be enforced.!l In one of the most recent cases dealing with the ongoing process of
liberalisation, the Bombay High Court was asked to prevent the Government of
India from implementing the Dunkel Proposals in P.B.Samanth Kumar v. Union
of India. The contention of the petitioner was that the Dunkel Draft cannot be
implemented by mere executive assent as the proposal involved several matters
which were exclusively within the jurisdiction of the States under List II of the
Second Schedule. i.e. the Court was asked to consider the scope of Articles 73
and 253 of the Constitution. Though the judgement as such may not be relevant for
the topic at hand13, Pendse J. explicitly spoke out of the primacy of International
Obligations undertaken by the Dunkel Agreement and that no interpretation should
be undertaken which would allow the wordings of Article 253 to circumscribe the
power of the Executive to enter into treaties under Article 73 of the Constitution. 14
In short the Judge relegated the arguments of the petitioner solely by using the
'incorporation' theory to determine the relationship between Articles 73 and 253
of the Constitution.
12

In one of the most interesting cases in this area of discussion is the case of
Civil Rights Vigilance Committee, S.L.S.R.C., College of Law, Bangalore v.
Union of India. 15 The facts of the case were that two English Cricketers, Geof
Boycott and Goef Cook, were part of the English team which were to tour India.
The contention of the petitioner was that India was a party to the Gleneagles
Accord of June 12, 1977,16 pursuant to which the two players were blacklisted for
11

It should however, be not forgotten as stated in the forewords of this project about the interpretative value of these treaties and customary Intemationallaw.

12 AIR 1994 Born. 323. The Indian Journal of Intentional law in Note: "Indian Judgements dealing
with International law", 34 LJ.I.L. 121 (1994) has labelled this judgement as one throwing open
key questions of both Constitutional issues
13

Especially given the fact that Pendse 1. declared the 'Dunkel drafts' to be a policy question
which were outside the competence of the Court and hence dismissed the petition. This attitude
of the Courts to declare 'self restraint' in matters of the economy has been reinforced by the
Courts in Delhi Science Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 405. In this case the writ
petitions were filed against the New Telecom Policy which encouraged private sector involvement and foreign participation in telecom areas. The above case belongs in the language of
Prof. Baxi to the species of "self inflicted wound on judicial power amounting (in phallocentric
idiom) to a self induced castration complex." See general/y, Introduction of Prof. Baxi to
I.P.Massey, Administrative Law, xxxii (1995).
14 The Court seems to have relied on Maganbhai Iswarbhai Patel v. Union of India, AIR 1969 SC
783 to determine the scope of the 'Executive power' under Article 73 of the Constitution.
15 AIR 1983 Kant 83 (Venkatachala J. for himself and D.M.Chandrashekhar C.J.)
16 The Gleneagles Accord of June 12, 1977 entered into by the member countries of the Commonwealth, wherein they reaffirmed their full support for the international campaign against apartheid. Boycott and Cook, as seen from the booklet issued in May 1981 by the United Nations
under the title "Centre against the Apartheid" were among the sportsmen blacklisted by the
United Nations for having participated in sports events in South Africa between the 1st December, 1980 and the 31st March, 1981.
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participating in sports events in South Africa. The petitioner contended that (I) the
action of the Government of India in allowing the two crickerters into India was a
violation of its International obligations; (2) Consequently a writ of mandamus be
issued to the Respondent under Article 226 of the Constitution so that the powers
of S.3 of the Foreigners Act, 194617 be used to prohibit the entry of the two
cricketeers into this country and if they have so entered, to ask them to leave the
country. The contention of the petitioner was that any treaty entered into by the
Government of India with a foreign country, forms part of the Municipal law of
India unless rights and obligations under such treaty conflict with any law made by
a competent legislature in India. Therefore the courts in India are competent to
enforce obedience by the Government of India of its obligations under such treaty
even in the absence of any legislation incorporating in the domestic law, the terms
of the treaty. The Court outrightly rejected the grandiose argument of the petitioner
and under the weight of several authorities'8 refused to read in the provisions of
the Gleneagles Accord into S. 3 of the Foreigners Act, 1946.
Another classic case wherein the courts have directly interpreted the provisions
of a treaty is that of Padam Kumar Agarwall v. The Additional Collector of
Customsl9• To summarise the facts of this case, a citizen of Nepal transported
lentils to Calcutta to be exported via sea. The respondent seized the goods, stating
that it amounted to 're-exporting' of goods and that this violated the provisions of
the Indo-Nepal Treaty of Trade and Transit, 1960.20 Denying the contention of the
respondent that the act of the appellant amounted to 're-exporting' of goods, the
Court held that since in this case, the lentils had been taken to Nepal, and then sent
for export (as against the goods without being taken to Nepal), it could not be
17 S. 3 of the Foreigners Act empowers the Central Government, by order, to make provision
either generally or with respect to all foreigners or with respect to any particular foreigner or
any prescribed class of description of foreigner, for prohibiting, regulating or restricting the
entry of foreigners into India or their departure therefrom or their presence or continued presence therein.
The Respondent contended that under the exemption provisions available under s.3-A of the
Act, in a Foreigners (Exemption) Order, 1957, the Central Government had exempted the provisions of the Act for the citizens of the United Kingdom
18 The Court relied on the commentaries of D.P.O.Connel , D. W.Greig and Oppenheim in para 14
of the Judgement to state that "While it is possible to regard customary international law as
part of English law, a similar principle does not apply to treaty rules. Although a treaty duly
ratified by the Crown will be binding under international law, if the treaty is to have internal
effect in the sense of changing legal rights, it will require, enabling legislation by parliament.
The Court also relied on the precedents of Birma v. State, AIR 1951 Raj. 127; Xavier v. Central
Bank Ltd., 1969 Ker.L.T. 927; and Jolly George Verghese v. Bank of Cochin, AIR 1980 SC
470, to state that the Court could not rely upon treaties in interpretation.
19

CivilAppealNo 1556 of 1970: seealsocommentin lllndJ. Int'l L. 669

20

The contention of the Respondent was that the Appellant had imported the lenthils from India
and had then exported them to another country.

(1971).
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termed as re-exporting within the provisions of the Treaty. However the larger
question, which would be of vital importance to this topic would be as to wnether a
penal action could be sustained under the terms of a treaty, given the fact that
Respondent in this case had launched penal proceeding under the terms of the
treaty. The Court decided that since the action of the Appellant had not in the first
place amounted to a violation of the terms of the treaty, there was no point in
deciding as to whether penal proceeding could infact be sustained when taken
directly under the terms of the treaty. Had the Court answered the question, much
could have been served to the cause of analysing the role of International law in
the interpretation of municipal actions.
Hence the general principle is that though municipal courts are competent to
inquire into matters involving the construction of treaties and other acts of states,
treaty obligations cannot be enforced in CourtS.21
Another interesting issue to be considered when examining the issue of treaties is as to 'when a municipal statute incorporates the terms of International conventions or peace treaties in the operative parts of the enactment, how such provision is to be determined, i.e. should it be interpreted according to the practises in
India or UK, (wherein the provision is also to be seen in light of the precedents in
the realm) or interpreted according to the intent of the legislature, so as to obtain
an unanimity of interpretation of the provision. Commenting on this, Lord Mac
Milan observed in Stag Line Ltd. v. Foscolo Mango and CO.22 while considering
the words 'reasonable deviation' in Article IV, Rule 4 of the Schedule of such an
Act that, "It is important to remember that the Act of 1924 was the outcome of an
International conference and that the rules in the Schedule have an International
currency. As these rules must come under the consideration of foreign courts, it is
desirable in the interests of uniformity that their interpretation should not be rigidly controlled by domestic precedents of antecedent date but rather that the language of the rules should be construed on broad principles of general acceptation. ,,23
21

22
23

Shri Krishna Sharma v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1954 Ca1591, 593. In this case there was
apparent repugnance between the Anglo-Tibet Trade Regulations, 1914 permitting free trade
between two countries on the one hand, and subsequent Indian statutes, e.g. Essential Supplies
Act, 1946 and the numerous orders issued thereunder putting restrictions on such free trade.
1932 AC 328; Joseph Inwald A.G. v. Pfeifer, (1928) 44 TLR 352 (HL); Administrator of
German Property v. Knoof, 1933 Ch. 439; But see Kramer v. A.G., 1923 A.C. 528.
See generally EA. Mann, "The Interpretation of Uniform Statutes", 62 L.Q.R. 278 (1976). The
learned author emphases that such an interpretation would only be in keeping in conformity
with the practise in civil law countries because such countries firstly, such countries have a
more liberal interpretation wherein precedents have only persuasive value as against any binding value; Secondly, the constitutional methods of transforming treaties into municipal law are
in most countries such that the character of treaties is preserved and Thirdly; in most countries
today there are theories relating to the interpretation of uniform legislation, and these have
undoubtedly contributed to an understanding of its problems.
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Cession of Indian Territory and treaties
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court was asked to sit on the legality of the
cession of territories to Pakistan or Bangladesh (The Tin Bigha episode). Though
interesting issues as to the interpretation oflnternational concepts were thrown up
during the course of the cases, the Apex Court chose to disallow any discourse on
International law deciding 'factually' that there was no cession at all. Amongst the
arguments which were thrown up in these cases, were those relating to the definition of cession, with respect to de jure and de facto sovereignty,24 and also the
principle of adverse possession,25 as understood in International law.
In the Berubari case26, the Supreme Court held that the power to cede and to
acquire territory is an essential attribute of sovereignty and this could be done by
the State in the exercise of its treaty making power.27 The argument that the power
to cede territory was covered by Article 3(c) (Unamended) of the Constitution was
rejected by the Court on the ground that,
"lfthe power to acquire foreign territory which, too is an essential attribute
of sovereignty, is not expressly conferred by the Constitution, there is no reason
why the power to cede a part of the national territory should have been provided
for by it. Both of these essential attributes of sovereignty are outside the Constitution and can be exercised by India as a sovereign State. "
Though the other parts of the judgement are not so relevant here, suffice to
say that the Court was propelled in its reasoning, by the attributes of sovereignty,
wherein the power of cession of territory was seen as an integral part of the powers
of a State. This International law principle wholly influenced the Court to determine the issue. However, such an approach was not forthcoming by the Court in
the Second Berubari case (Ram Kishore Sen v. Union of India)28, wherein a question was raised regarding a part of the village Chilaki, which under the Radcliffe
Award of 1947 had gone to Pakistan on the partition of British India but which
was being administered by India. It was claimed that the territory belonged to
India by adverse possession in International law and that its transfer to Pakistan
now, would amount to cession of Indian territory. The Calcutta High Court discussed at great length the law of adverse possession in International law. It cited

24

D.D. Cement Co. v. I.T.Commissioner,

AIR 1958 SC 823.

25

Ram Kishore Sen v. Union of India, AIR 1965 Cal., 282 (Second Berubari case). (The argument
of adverse possession was however disallowed by the Apex Court.)

26

AIR 1960 SC 845.

27
28

See entry 14 in List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution ofIndia.
AIR 1966 SC 644.
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authorities like Oppenheim and Jennings29 and other arguments brought out by the
petitioner. However the Supreme Court disallowed such an approach citing that
since the Union of India and the State of West Bengal had all along accepted that
the village did belong to Pakistan, the issue of adverse possession did not arise and
the territory could be transferred by mere executive agreement. (Since India had
already accepted that the territory had been a part of Pakistan, the question of
following the Procedure of amending the Constitution did not arise.)
In Magambhai Iswarbhai Patel v. Union of IndiaJO the Court was again called
upon to decide whether the implementation of the Kutch Award wherein few areas were to be handed over to Pakistan amounted to cession of territory and hence
necessitated the following of the constitutional procedure as laid out in the First
Berubari case. The Government of India contended that the Award itself was the
operative treaty and after demarcation, it would be only necessary to exchange
letters recognising the established border. It is significant to note that before the
Kutch Award come about, the Government of India was consistently claiming that
the territories belonged to India. The Court, surprisingly came to the rescue of the
executive by upholding its stand by stating that it was not sitting in appeal over the
Award of the Tribunal and that it would assess any concrete evidence to establish
that these territories belonged to India". The Court ruled that none of the territories did infact belong to India and that it only exercised defacto sovereignty. 31 It
has been held32 that one of the reasons for the Court to come to this conclusion
was the fact that India had already committed itself to implement the Award and a
decision that this amounted to cession of India territory would compel the Government go to Parliament for a constitutional amendment which it might fail to get
and put it in a very awkward situation. However, issue that did become clear from
atleast the last of these cases was that the Court is not bound by the finding of the
Tribunal and can reassess the evidence, which has been evaluated. If the Court
were to come to a conclusion, which was different from the tribunal, then it
amounted to 'cession' and then the appropriate constitutional procedure had to be
followed.

29
30

Jennings, Acqusition of Territory in International Law, (1963).
AIR 1969 SC 783.

3I

Several authors have heavily criticised this judgment of the Court on the ground that the Court
was not right in deciding that India had only defacto control. See generally, S.K.Agarwala,
"India's contribution to the Deveopment of International Law- The Role of Indian Courts",
R.P. Anand (ed.); Asian States and the Development of International Law, 72 (1972).
Ibid.

32
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CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE COMITY OF
NATIONS CAN BE CONSULTED IN CASE OF AN 'AMBIGUITY'
One of the rarest and clearest instances of the Supreme Court's probing into
the International law vs a provision of a Indian Statute is that of the famous case of
Jolly George Verghese v. Bank of Cochin, 33 wherein the self confessed patriarch
of the definition of 'Liberty' in the Indian milieu, Krishna Iyer J. dwelt at length
with the role of the International law in the interpretation of Indian statutes. The
Court in this case was concerned with relationship between S. 51, proviso (b) and
Article 11 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The attention of the Court was drawn to the wordings in S. 51 "or has had since the date of
the decree, the means to pay the amount of the decree." This implies on a first
reading (the Court declared a 'first reading' to be a 'superficial reading') of S. 51
proviso (b), that if at any time after the passing of any, old decree the judgementdebtor had come by some resource and had not discharged the decree, he could be
detained in prison even though at the later point of time he was found to be penniless. The Court found that such an interpretation was contrary to Article 11 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Before analysing the method
and reasons adapted by the Court in applying the principle of International law
onto a provision of an enacted statute, the general observations or the obiter of the
Court in its preponderance of the incidence of Intemationallaw in the interpretation of Indian Statutes has to be realised.34 At the outset the Court did agree that
"From the national point of view, the national rules alone count... .. With regard to
interpretation, however, it is a principle generally recognised in national legal
systems that, in the event of doubt, the national rule is to be interpreted in
accordance with the State's International obligations. However, the Court did
sound the word of caution that the Declaration of Human Rights merely sets a
33

AIR 1980 SC 470; On the issue of the international law influence on S. 51, c.P.C, the Supreme
Court leaned heavily on a case decided on similar facts in Xavier v. Canara Bank Limited, 1969
Ker. L T 927. Jolly George Verghese's case is also important when considered from the view
point of the development of the Maneka Gandhi thesis making intrusions into the vistas of
Article 21 of the Constitution.

34

The Court went through a bulk of Common law Commentaries on the Relationship between
International and Municipal law primary being A.H. Robertson, Human Rights in National and
International law, (1992) and O. Hood Phillips, Constitutional and Administrative Law, (6th
ed., 1988), to pronounce its approval on the incorporation theory whilst in the decision itself
the Court seems to make explicit statements of being limited by the transformation theory in its
adoptions of International Conventions and Practices. Perhaps this case stands apart for the
innovativeness of arguments utilised by the Counsels for both the Appellants and the Respondents. While the Appellant pleaded in the 'interest of justice' that 'International law' be applied,
the Responded countered the suggestion by ambitiously suggesting that 'International law is
the vanishing point of jurisprudence' and that an inchoate understanding be not applied to the
facts of the case.
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common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations but cannot create
a binding set of rules.35
On a dispassionate (to countenance the 'superficial reading' which Krishna
Iyer would have accused the reader of) reading of S. 51 proviso (b), c.P.c. can it
be said that there is an ambiguity which warranted the Supreme Court to lean
heavily on the International Covenant in this case? While this project does not
entail a case critical analysis of the term 'ambiguity' as understood by the Supreme Court, it is submitted that the Supreme Court was visibly moved by the
Dicean Rule of Law to contain the imprisonment of a debtor who due to subsequent events lost the means to pay the debts to the creditor.36 To silence any criticism the judgement may be subjected to from any quarters for its reliance on the
International Covenant, the Court relied on the 45th Law Commission which had
cognised the relevance of the International Covenant in matters of execution.
In India, unlike in the U.S. and the U.K. (sometimes), the instances wherein
Statutes themselves compel the Courts to apply "Practises of International law"
are very rare. One such case is with the Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf,
Exclusive Economic Zone and Other Maritime Zones Act, 1976 which under S. 3
(3) provides that the limit of territorial sea can be altered W.r.t. International law
and State Practise. A discussion on this sub section came up in Captain Subhash
Kumarv. The Port Officer, Mercantile Marine Department, Madra/7• To analyse
the definition of 'territorial seas' the Court examined Ss. 2 and 21 of the Mercantile Shipping Act, 1958 to decide that a clear definition of 'territorial seas' could
be gathered from S. 3(3) of the Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive
Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act, 1976 which fell back on the practises of International law and came to the conclusion that the territorial sea extended to a limit of 12 nautical miles and hence the prosecution in this case could
not be sustained. What is perhaps significant in this case is that though this case
cannot be quoted as one which dealt with any patent or latent ambiguity, the judge35

It is to be noted that while India is not a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
it is a signatory to both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Social and Economic Rights. See generally Chowdry and Chaturvedi, Fundamental Rights and the Constitution, (1994).

36

The Court expressed three primary functions of the Diecean Rule (I) It influences legislators
(2) its principles provide canons of interpretation (3) Due to this English Courts lean in favour
of the liberty of the Citizen. C.f. a.Hood Phillips, Constitutional and Administrative Law, (6th
ed., 1988).

37

AIR 1991 SC 1632.; In this case the appellant was charged with negligence in managing a ship
which resulted in the loss of 11 lives at a distance of 220 nautical miles from the nearest coast.
The appellant charged that the prosecution could not be sustained under s.358 of the Mercantile
Shipping Act, 1958 as the accident had not occurred within the 'territorial seas' .
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ment epitomises the freedom with which the Court has utili sed the argument of
International law in the definitional function which it was asked to perform in this
case.
Apart from these cases, certain issues which can be analysed under various
headings are as follows:
Citizenship and the change of sovereignty
Under the Montevideo Convention 'population,38 is spelt out as one of the
attributes of sovereignty. It has been recognised by some publicists that with the
change of sovereignty, the population may be given a choice as to chose to retain
the citizenship of the erstwhile State.39 This aspect came up for two discussion in
two Goa cases, in G.Y.Bhandare v. E.J.J Sequera40 and in G.Y.Bhandare v.
Erasmo 41. In both these cases, the petitioner challenged the capacity of the respondents to file election petitions on the ground that both the respondents were
not citizens of India. The issue which was called into question was Para 2 of the
Goa, Daman and Diu (Citizenship) Order, 196242.The main issue before the Court
was as to whether under Para 2 a person becomes a citizen of India first and then
has an option to make a declaration before the concerned officer stating his intention to retain his Portuguese citizenship 43or whether he is only deemed to become
a citizenship under the main provision of Para 2 and if he does not make a declaration under the provsio his citizenship is confirmed. The Court preferred the later
interpretation due to a variety of reasons. Though primarily the Court was influenced by the deeming word which was mentioned in para 2, the choice was also
made to prevent an interpretation which would provide the Respondents a dual
citizenship (which is not recognised in India).
38

The Montevedio Convention on the Rights and Duties of States; 165 L.N.T.S. 19; V.S.T.S. 881;
28 Am. J. Int'!. L. Supp. 75 (1934).

39

40

One recent example can be of the people of Indian origin in Hong Kong who after the merger of
Hong Kong into mainland China were given the option to retain their British citizenship. See
generally, Brownlie, "Individuals in International law", II Int'!. & Compo L. Q., 701 (1962);
Higgins, "Status of Individuals in Intentional law", 4 B.J.I.S, I (1978); Gormley; The Procedural Status of The Individual Before International and Supernational Tribunals, (1966).
AIR 1972 Goa II.

41

AIR 1972 Goa 28.

42

Para 2 declared that every person who was born before Dec.1961 or whose either or both
parents or grandparents were in Goa before Dec.1961 were deemed to be citizens of India.
The Proviso provided that he can retain his citizenship provided he made a declaration to that
effect before a concerned officer within 3 months of Dec.1961.

43

Such an interpretation would then be ultra vires S. 7 of the Citizenship Act because under S. 7
the power is only given to determine who is a citizen and not as to whether who can renounce
citizenship.
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This cases perhaps rests on the reasoning that the choice of the interpretation
hinges on the concept of single citizenship.44
Does the rights against the old Sovereign continue against the new
Sovereign?
Another issue which is connected with the relationship between citizens and
the New Sovereign is that of a change in the sovereignty by acquisition or otherwise and its resultant impact on the previously created rights of citizens. The Indian Courts have had the occasion to deal with issue extensively in a catena of
cases. It has been held by the Privy council45 and followed subsequently by other
Courts 46as well that:
"When a territory is acquired by a sovereign state for the first time that is an
act of State. It matters not how the acquisition has been brought about. It
may be by cession following on treaty, it may be by occupation of territory
hitherto unoccupied by a recognised ruler. In all cases the result is the same.
Any inhabitant of the territory can make good in the municipal Courts established by the new sovereign only such rights as that sovereign has through
his officers, recognised. Such rights as he has under the rule of predecessors
avail him nothing."
Moreover, the Courts have held after Pema Chibar's cas/7 that (1) The
fact that laws which were in force in the conquered territory are continued by the

44

The Indian Citizenship Act 1955, provides that if any person voluntarily acquires the citizenship of another country, he will cease to be a citizen of India. Reference here may be had to
State v. Abdullah Khan, AIR 1963 Raj.ll wherein in the process of the interpretation of Article
5 of the Constitution, the Courts rejected the concept of Dual citizenship.

45

Vajeshingji Joravarsingji v. Secretary of State, AIR 1924 PC 216.

46

The above propostion has been accepted in a number of cases: See generally, Secretary of State
v. Rustam Khan, AIR 1941 PC 64; Da/mia Dadri Cement Co. Ltd. v. C.I.T., AIR 1958 SC 816;
State of Saurashtra v. Memon Haji Ismail Haji, AIR 1959 SC 1383; Pramod Chandra v. State
of Orissa, AIR 1961 SC 1361 and Penza Chibar v. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 1288. A
discordant note was struck by Bose J. who spoke for the Court in Virendra Singh v. The State
of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 447, but a 7 judge bench held by majority (Subba Rao J.
dissenting) in State ofGujarat v. Vor Fiddali, AIR 1964 SC 1043 that Virendra Singh's case
was decided wrongly.

47

AIR 1966 SC 442; In this case the petitioner had licenses issued to him under the Portuguese
Governments under the Portuguese After the annexation of Goa, though the Administration
Act continued the previous laws, only certain type of import licenses were recognised. The
petitioner contended that the very fact that the respondent continued the laws meant that the
petitioner's rights had been recognised and secondly that even if the laws had not been continued, the rights of the petitioner had to be protected. The Court negatived both these contentions .
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new government after the conquest is not by itself enough to show that the new
sovereign has recognised the rights under the old laws; (2) The rights which arose
out of the old laws prior to the conquest or annexation can be enforced against the
new sovereign only if he has chosen to recognise those rights.
The Court was called upon to apply these techniques in the case of Vinod
Kumar Shantilal Ghosalia v. Gangadhara Narsingdas Agarwala 48. The case is of
importance because of the following facts: The Respondent had obtained certain
titles of manifest for the purpose of mining from the Portuguese Government and
under the then Portuguese law then prevalent in Goa, the titles of manifest when
certified gave full ownership over the mines. After the annexation of Goa, the
same mines were allotted to the Appellant. Of distinct importance was the fact that
there was an interregnum between December 20, 1961 and March 5th 1962 when
the Goa Daman and Diu (Laws) Regulation Act was passed which under s. 4(2)(b)
provided that "any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or
incurred under any law so repealed".
It was the contentions of the respondent that by virtue of the said provision
his mining manifest were recognised. The ambiguity in this case was largely related to the legal position in the interim period between when the conquest occurred, and when the new laws were passed. Influenced by the earlier decisions,
the court endorsed the stand that in International law, a new Sovereign is not
bound to recognise the rights granted to the people by the previous sovereign. The
Court decided, that during the interregnum between December 20th, 1961 and March
5th, 1962, the old laws of the Proteges regime were not in operation in the conquered territory of Goa. Secondly, the rights recognised under S. 4(2) of the Regulation did not extend any protection to the rights which had accrued prior to
December 20th, 1961 but envisaged only such rights which had come into being
after March 5th, 1962 by reason of the laws continued by the Act and the Regulation. Here, though both the interpretations were possible, the Courts chose not to
recognise the rights of the respondent taking into note the general principle that
with the change in sovereignty, the duties of the new sovereign are not to be related back to the obligations undertaken by its predecessor.
However, the Mysore High Court chose the first option in Rung Rao v. State
of Madras. 49 Finding that the Union of India had neither recognised nor repudiated the grants given to the Appellant by the erstwhile Nizam of Hyderabad, the
Court said that non repudiation of the Grant for a period of time implied a recognition of the grant. Once the grant had been recognised (impliedly), it was not liable
to be cancelled. It is submitted that this judgement is highly questionable in the light
48

C.f. 21 Ind. J. Int'l. L. (1981) p. 582.

49

AIR 1972 Mys. 98.
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emanating from the highest Court of the land. As
the right presumption would be that the principle of
sovereign cannot be bound by the duties of its predcan be displaced only be a positive act of taking on

INTERNATIONAL NORMS IN THE INTERPRETATION
III OF THE CONSTITUTION

OF PART

It has been observed that the Courts in their new proactive vigour have increasingly sought guidance from International Conventions, especially in the area
of Human Rights. They have sought to give the liberty and freedom clauses in the
Indian Constitution a better manifestation.
In the land mark case of A.D.M. Jabalpurv. Shivakant Shukli' Khanna J., in
his dissenting opinion while considering the implications of the 'due process'
implications in Article 21 analysed that the rule oflaw enshrined in Article 14 has
a brooding omnipresence in Article 21 and that the procedure adopted by the State
has to be 'just reasonable and fair'. The spirit and succour of the judgement of the
learned judge which was unhesitantly ratified by the Supreme Court later in the
watershed decision of Maneka Gandhi's case, relied unerringly on numerous International Covenants (most notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Social and Economic Rights) to analyse the content of the terms 'procedure' and 'law' as employed in Article 21. Pleading that Article 21 ought to have
been interpreted in conformity with Internationally recognised rights of the accused (the Court was specifically concerned with criminal procedure and punishment in this case), the learned judge in the midst of his thesis calling for a liberal
interpretation of Article 21 said that

"If two constructions of the municipal law are possible, the courts should
lean in favour of adopting such construction as would make the provisions of the municipal law to be in harmony with the International law
or treaty obligations. This rule about the construction of municipal law
also holds when construing the provisions of the Constitution."s2
50

The S.c. also followed a similar reasoning w.r.t. Tax evasion in Shri Subbalaxmi Mills Ltd. v.
Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 750 ; However the same court in the same year gave a contrary
opinion in Bansikhdas Premsukh Das v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 40.

51

(1976) 2 SCC 521: AIR 1976 SC 1207: 1976 Cri L J 945.

52

The use of Intemationallaw to achieve clarity in the interpretation of clarity of Part 1II rights
has wholly been endorsed by the Courts in the landmark 13 judge bench decision of
Keshavananda Bharathi v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225: AIR 1973 SC 1461.
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While interpreting the development of the Right to Privacy as a facet of
Article 21, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the influence of Human
Rights covenants on this subject. In the case of People's Unionfor Civil Liberties
(PUCL) v. Union of India, 53 the Court had to examine the legality of the 'telephone tapping' carried out by the Government. Holding that in the instant case,
the action of the Government of tapping under S. 5(2) of the Telegraph Act
amounted to the violation of the Right to Privacy, (enshrined in Article 21) the
Court declared that
"India is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 1966. Article 17 thereof provides for the right to privacy. Article 12
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 is almost in similar
terms. Article 17 of the International Covenant does not go contrary to any
part of our municipal law. Article 21 of the Constitution has, therefore, to be
interpreted in conformity with International law. "
While dealing with the point of the role of Customary International law in
the interpretation of the 'liberty clause' under the Indian Constitution, one of the
cases wherein the Court went deep into International human Rights was in Kubic
Dariuz v. Union of India.54 While the Supreme Court upheld the contentions of
the Peitioner on the ground of violation of the Fundamental Right of the accused,
the Court considered favourably the independent argument of the accused under
International law55, especially referring to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the two Covenants on International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights. The Court
held that "Preventive Detention of a foreign national who is not resident of the
country involves an element ofInternational law and human rights and the appropriate authorities ought not to be seen to have been oblivious of its International
obligations in this regard." The Court then detailed that inter-state ameliorative
practises had developed in the cases of extradition, criminal prosecution and punitive (as opposed to preventive detention). At para 20 the Court stated "There may
be cases where while a citizen and resident of the Country deserves preventive
53

(1997) 1 SCC 301: AIR 1997 SC 568. The Court in this case relied heavily on its earlier
precedents like Kharak Singh v. State of u.P., (1964) 1 SCR 332: AIR 1963 SC 1295 and
R.Rajagopal v. State ofT.N., (1994) 6 SCC 632.

54

AIR 1990 SC 605-616; The facts of this case was that the Petitioner who was a Polish was
arrested under the COFEPOSA for smuggling gold. Further, he was also put on preventive
detention. due to which he could not secure bail. The petitioner alleged a violation of Article
22(5) of the Constitution, as he claimed that he did not understand English and that his deposition to the Detaining Authority had not been considered.

55

Characteristically, the Court after its lengthy discourse on the Rights of foreign detainees,
stated that it was not required to rule on this argument.
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detention in the event of which no International legal assistance is possible unlike in
the case of criminal prosecution and punishment." Hence, it would not be wrong to
state that the arguments under International law covertly influenced the pleading
of the accused.
One of the most interesting utilisation ofInternational Conventions and Norms
has been in the recent case of Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan56 wherein the Court
laid down extensive guidelines for the prevention of the sexual harrassment of
women in the work place.57 According to the Court, International Conventions
and norms, consistent with the spirit of the fundamental rights, can be read into
those rights for interpreting them in the larger context to promote the objects of
the Constitution. In the absence of domestic law on the particular aspect, these
conventions and norms as ratified by India, can be relied on by the Supreme Court
to formulate guidelines for enforcement of fundamental rights.
CONCLUSION - GENERAL PRINCIPLES REVISITED
It could be stated that fifty years of active reasoning by the Courts have
neither produced clarity nor laid down proper guidelines in the use of Internationallaw in municipal isses. Perhaps, the position of the Courts may only be a
reflection of the hesitation experienced by other countries who in the foster years
of legal innovations came across this dilemma on the utilisation of International
law in municipal courts. What however, is worthy of note is that the emergence of
a strong "fundamental rights based approach" by the courts has seen much reliance being placed on a plethora of Human Rights Instruments and Covenants.
Infact, the Fundamental Rights revolution in India has been aptly aided by frequent references to such human rights documents.
Before concluding, it would be pertinent to revisit some general principles
which could form the basis of the future relationship of International law and
Constitutional law in India in the future. The Constitution of India gives no clear
direction regarding the relationship of International law to the municipal law of
India. The main provision is contained in Article 51(c), which incidentally falls
within the Directive Principles of State (a non justiciable part of the Constitution).
However, as observed by C.H. Alexander,58 "The Constitution of India provides
for the continued operation of the 'law in force' immediately preceding the commencement of the Constitution". Therefore on the analogy of the English Com-

56

(1997) 6 SCC 241: 1997 SCC (Cri) 932: AIR 1997 SC 3011.

57

The case also adds a new dimension to the already expansive Article 32 of the Constitution. The
Court also relied on Articles 51(c), 51 A(e) and (t), 253 & Sch. VIl List I entry 14.

58

C.H. Alexander, "International law in India", Int'1.

& Compo L.Q.

292 (1952).
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mon Law, the municipal courts of India have applied the provisions of the treaties
entered into by India if they had been incorporated into the municipal law through
legislation and the well recognised principles ofInternational customary law have
been applied because they are supposed to form part of the law of the land. "Under
such a situation of the incorporation of International law into the municipal law, the
Courts have a 'relative freedom so far as customary principles ofInternationallaw
are concerned. But in all other areas they are fettered by the appropriate municipal
legislation incorporating rules ofInternationallaw.
As stated earlier, it is impossible to lay down clearly any hard and fast rule as
regards the utility of International law in municipal law . While the difference between treaties and customary International law does exist, the rationale for the
distinction is being increasingly questioned. Though Indian Courts have refused
to look at treaties unless they are reduced to municipal law obligations, such treaties have become effective tools of interpretation for British courts and the trend is
to treat Treaties and Customary Norms of International law on par. As stated earlier, with judicial hyperactivism underway, it may not take long for the Indian
judiciary to follow suit.

